Two-player games on graphs provide the mathematical foundation for the study of reactive systems. In the quantitative framework, an objective assigns a value to every play, and the goal of player 1 is to minimize the value of the objective. In this framework, there are two relevant synthesis problems to consider: the quantitative analysis problem is to compute the minimal (or infimum) value that player 1 can assure, and the boolean analysis problem asks whether player 1 can assure that the value of the objective is at most ν (for a given threshold ν). Mean-payoff expression games are played on a multidimensional weighted graph. An atomic mean-payoff expression objective is the mean-payoff value (the long-run average weight) of a certain dimension, and the class of mean-payoff expressions is the closure of atomic mean-payoff expressions under the algebraic operations of max, min, numerical complement and sum. In this work, we study for the first time the strategy synthesis problems for games with robust quantitative objectives, namely, games with mean-payoff expression objectives. While in general, optimal strategies for these games require infinite-memory, in synthesis we are typically interested in the construction of a finite-state system. Hence, we consider games in which player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies, and our main contribution is as follows. We prove that for mean-payoff expressions, the quantitative analysis problem is computable, and the boolean analysis problem is inter-reducible with Hilbert's tenth problem over rationals -a fundamental long-standing open problem in computer science and mathematics.
Introduction
In the classical framework of boolean formal verification, a program may only violate or satisfy a given specification, and in the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CSL-LICS 2014, July 14-18, 2014, Vienna, Austria. Copyright c 2014 ACM 978-1-4503-2886-9. . . $15.00. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2603088.2603096 framework of synthesis, the task is to automatically construct a program that satisfies the specification. The boolean framework does not discriminate between programs that satisfy a given specification, and consequently, it may produce (or verify) unreasonable implementations.
In the recent years, there is an emerging line of research that aims to measure the quality of a program with quantitative metrics, e.g., [1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11] . The quantitative verification problem asks how well a program satisfies a given specification, and the synthesis task is to construct the optimal program with respect to a specification.
Quantitative verification and synthesis problems are modelled by infinite-duration games over weighted graphs. In these games, the set of vertices is partitioned into player-1 and player-2 vertices; initially, a pebble is placed on an initial vertex, and in every round, the player who owns the vertex that the pebble resides in, advances the pebble to an adjacent vertex. This process is repeated forever and gives rise to a play that induces an infinite sequence of weights (or weight vectors), and a quantitative objective assigns a value to every play (or equivalently to every infinite sequence of weights).
The classical work on these games only considered games with single objectives, such as minimizing the long run average weight, or minimize the sum of weights. In order to have robust quantitative specifications, it is necessary to investigate games on graphs with multiple (and possibly conflicting) objectives. Typically, multiple objectives are modeled by multidimensional weight functions (e.g., [1, 4, 5, 10] ), and the outcome of a play is a vector of values. In the boolean setting, the goal of player 1 is to satisfy a boolean condition on the values (with respect to a threshold vector). For example, player 1 needs to assure that the average response time (rt) of an arbiter is at most 2.4 and that the average energy consumption (ec) is below 7. In the quantitative setting, the outcome of a play is a unique (real) value, and the goal of player 1 is to minimize the value of the play. A multiple objective specification is modelled by algebraic operations on single objectives. In the example above, we define the quantitative objective max(rt − 2.4, ec − 7), and a non-positive value to the quantitative objective implies that the boolean objective is satisfied. In the general case, an objective is determined either by the projection of the weight function to one dimension, or it is formed by algebraic operation on two (or more) objectives. In the literature, the common and natural algebraic operations are min,max, numerical complement (multiplication by −1) and sum. We note that when the goal is to minimize the value of the objective, then the first three operations generalize the boolean disjunction, conjunction and negation. A class of quantitative objectives is robust if it is closed under the four algebraic operations. So far, the only known class of robust quantitative objectives that has an effective algorithm for the model checking problem (that is, for solving one-player games) is the class of meanpayoff expressions [6] , which is the closure of one-dimensional mean-payoff (long-run average of the weights) objectives to the four algebraic operation. For example, for an infinite sequence of vectors a = a1, a2, · · · ∈ (R 3 ) ω the objective E(a) = LimAvg 1 (a) + min(LimAvg 2 (a), −LimAvg 3 (a))
is a mean-payoff expression (where LimAvg i is the long-run average of dimension i) and E((1, 2, 6) ω ) = 1 + min(2, −6) = −5. In the quantitative setting, there are two relevant synthesis problems: (i) the quantitative analysis problem is to compute the optimal (infimum) value that a player-1 strategy can assure; and (ii) the boolean analysis problem is to determine whether player 1 can assure a value of at most ν to the objective (for a given ν). From the perspective of synthesis, these problems are most important when player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies (in Example 4 we show that infinite-memory strategies may yield a better value for player 1, hence the restriction to finite-memory strategies may affect the analysis of the synthesis problem).
For mean-payoff expressions, optimal finite-memory strategies may not always exist. Hence, the quantitative analysis problem is to compute the greatest lower bound on the minimal value that player 1 can assure. We note that since all model checking problems (i.e., the quantitative generalization of the emptiness, universality and language inclusion) are decidable for mean-payoff expression, then the computability of the quantitative analysis will give us an effective algorithm to synthesize ǫ-optimal finite-memory strategies, and if the boolean analysis problem were decidable, then we would have an algorithm that construct the corresponding player-1 strategy. Our contribution. In this paper, we consider for the first time the synthesis problem for a robust class of quantitative objectives. We prove computability for the quantitative synthesis problem, and we show that the boolean analysis problem is inter-reducible with Hilbert's tenth problem over rationals (H10 (Q)), which is a fundamental long-standing open question in computer science and mathematics. We show that the problem is inter-reducible with H10 (Q) even when both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies, and we show that there is a fragment of mean-payoff expressions that is H10 (Q)-hard when one or both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies, but decidable when both players may use infinite-memory strategies.
Our main technical contribution is the introduction of a general scheme that lifts a one-player game solution (equivalently, a model checking algorithm) to a solution for a two-player game (when player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies). The scheme works for a large class of quantitative objectives that have certain properties (which we define in Subsection 2.2). Related work. The class of mean-payoff expressions was introduced in [6] , and the decidability of the model checking problems (which correspond to one-player games) was established. A simpler and more efficient algorithm for mean-payoff expression games was given in [15] . Mean-payoff games on multidimensional graphs were first studied in [9] . In these games the objective of player 1 was to satisfy a conjunctive condition (in the terms of this paper, the objective was a maximum of multiple one-dimensional objectives). In [16] , decidability for an objective that is formed by the min and max operators was established. But the proof can not be extended to include the numerical complement operator, and it does not scale for the case that player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies. Structure of the paper. In the next section we give the basic definitions for quantitative games and we define a class of quantitative objectives that have special properties. In Sections 3 and 4 we give a generic solution for the synthesis problem of quantitative objectives that satisfies the special properties (and an overview of the solution is given in Subsection 2.3). In Section 5 we show that mean-payoff expressions satisfy the special properties and the main results of the paper follow. Due to lack of space, some of the proofs were omitted, and the full proofs are available in the technical report [17] .
Games with Quantitative Objectives
In this section we give the formal definitions for quantitative objectives and games on graphs with quantitative objectives (Subsection 2.1). We define four special properties of quantitative objectives (Subsection 2.2), and we give an informal overview for the two-player game solution of games with quantitative objectives that satisfy the special properties (Subsection 2.3).
Quantitative games on graphs
Quantitative objectives. In this paper we consider directed finite graphs with a k-dimensional weight function that assigns a vector of rationals to each edge. A quantitative objective is a function that assigns a value to every infinite sequence of weight vectors. Formally an objective is a function obj : (R k ) ω → R. A simple example for quantitative objective is to consider a one-dimensional weight function and an objective that assigns to each infinite path the maximal weight that occurs infinitely often in the path. An
Algebraic operations over quantitative objectives. The quantitative counterpart of the boolean operations of disjunction, conjunction and negation are the max,min and numerical complement operators (numerical complement is multiplication by −1). The sum operator, which does not have a boolean counterpart, is also very natural operator in the framework of quantitative objectives. For two quantitative objectives obj 1 and obj 2 , the quantitative objective op(obj 1 , obj 2 ) (for op ∈ {min, max, sum}) assigns to every infinite sequence of weights ℓ ∈ (R k ) ω the value op(obj 1 (ℓ), obj 2 (ℓ)), and the numerical complement of obj 1 assigns the value of −obj 1 (ℓ). Robust quantitative objectives A class of quantitative objectives O is robust if it is closed under the algebraic operations of min, max, sum and numerical complement. Formally, a class of objectives O is robust, if for every two objectives obj 1 , obj 2 ∈ O the four quantitative objectives obj min , obj max , obj sum and obj − are in O (such that for every ℓ ∈ (R k ) ω and op ∈ {min, max, sum}: obj op (ℓ) = op(obj 1 (ℓ), obj 2 (ℓ)) and obj − (ℓ) = −obj 1 (ℓ)). We note that in [6, 8] , Chatterjee et al. gave a broader definition for robustness of quantitative objectives, but since the concrete objectives that we consider in this paper are robust according to both definitions, we prefer to use the narrower (and simpler) notion of robustness. Games on graph. A game graph is a directed graph G = (V = V1 ∪ V2, v0, E, w : E → Q k ), where V is the set of vertices; Vi is the set of player i vertices; v0 is the initial vertex; E ⊆ V ×V is the set of edges; and w : E → Q k is a multidimensional weight function (e.g., see Figure 1 ). A play is an infinite sequence of rounds. In the first round a pebble is placed on the initial vertex and in every round the player who owns the vertex of the pebble advances the pebble to an adjacent vertex. Hence, a play corresponds to an infinite path in the graph that begins in v0 and the labeling of the play is the corresponding infinite sequence of weight vectors. A game graph is a one-player game if only one of the players has a vertex with out-degree more than one. Strategies. A strategy is a recipe for determining the next move based on the history of the play. A player-i strategy is a function σ : V * Vi → V , such that for every finite path π that ends in vertex v we have (v, σ(π)) ∈ E. A strategy has finite memory if it can be implemented by a Moore machine (M, m0, αn, αu), where M is We denote the set of all player-i strategies by Si and we denote the set of all player-i finite memory strategies by F Mi. Game graph according to a finite-memory strategy. For a game graph G = (V = V1 ∪ V2, E, w) and a player-1 finite-memory strategy σ = (M, m0, αu, αn), we denote the game graph according to strategy σ by G σ , and we define it as follows: • The vertices of G σ are the Cartesian product V × M ; player-i vertices are Vi × M ; and the initial vertex of G σ is (v0, m0).
• For a player-1 vertex (v, m), the only successor vertex is (αn(v, m), αu(v, m)). For a player-2 vertex (v, m) the set of successor vertices is {(u, n) | (v, u) ∈ E and αu(v, m) = n}. We note that the out-degree of all player-1 vertices is one, and thus G σ is a one-player game graph. The main property of graphs according to a finite-memory strategy is that every infinite path in G σ corresponds to a play that is consistent with σ in G. A game graph according to a memoryless strategy is a special case of games according to finite-memory strategies. In this case, the game graph is obtained from G by removing all the player's out-edges that are not chosen by the memoryless strategy. Values of strategies and games. A tuple (σ, τ ) of player-1 and player-2 strategies (respectively) uniquely defines a play πσ,τ in a
given graph. For a game graph G, a quantitative objective obj and a tuple of strategies (σ, τ ) we denote Val σ,τ = obj (πσ,τ ). In this paper, we assume that player 1 wishes to minimize 1 the value of the quantitative objective, and we define the value of a player-1 strategy σ to be Val σ = sup τ ∈S 2 Val σ,τ . (Intuitively, this is the maximal value that player 2 can achieve against strategy σ.) The minimal value of a game is defined as infσ∈FM 1 Val σ . Intuitively, the minimal value of a game is the minimal value that player 1 can ensure by a finite-memory strategy. Quantitative and boolean analysis For a given game graph, objective, and a rational threshold r ∈ Q: The quantitative analysis task is to compute the minimal value of the game that can be enforced by a finite-memory strategy. The boolean analysis task is to decide whether there is a player-1 finite-memory strategy σ for which Val σ ≤ r. That is, whether player 1 can assure a value of at most r for the objective. Boolean games and winning strategies. A boolean game is a game on graph equipped with a winning condition W ⊆ E ω (that is, a winning condition is a set of infinite paths). A play π is winning for player 1 if π ∈ W , and a strategy σ is a player-1 winning strategy if for every player-2 strategy τ we have πσ,τ ∈ W . For a quantitative objective obj and a threshold ν ∈ R we denote by (obj , ν) the boolean winning condition {π ∈ E ω | obj (π) ≤ ν}.
One-player game solution
In this paper, we consider objectives that have special properties for their one-player game solution and we present a general scheme that lifts a one-player game solution into a two-player game solution. To formally define the special properties of the solutions, we give the next definitions. Definitions and notions for weighted graphs.
The weight vector of a finite path π = e1 . . . en is w(π) = n i=1 w(ei) and the average weight of a path is
. For a set of finite paths Π = {π1, . . . , πn} we denote Avg(Π) = {Avg(π1), . . . , Avg(πn)}. We denote the set of simple cycles in G by C(G), and we abbreviate Avg(G) = Avg(C(G)). For a finite set of vectors
, and the rational interior of a simplex is QSI(m) = SI(m) ∩ Q m . When m is clear from the context we abbreviate S(m), SI(m) and QSI(m) with S, SI and QSI (respectively). Solution for one-player game with special properties. A solution for a one-player quantitative game is a function f that assigns to every one-player game graph G the maximal value that the player can achieve in graph G. We note that for prefix-independent objectives, a function f ′ that assigns to each strongly connected graph its maximal value uniquely defines the solution function f (since the value of f is the maximal value of f ′ over all the strongly connected component of the graph). In this paper, we will consider only prefix-independent objective, hence, we define the special properties of a solution for strongly connected graphs. The special properties that we consider are:
1. First-order definable. For every n ∈ N there is a first-order formula ζn(x1, . . . , xn, y) over R, =, <, +, × such that for every graph G with Avg(G) = {x1, . . . , xn} we have f (G) = y if and only if ζn(x1, . . . , xn, y) holds. In addition we require ζn to be computable from n. In the sequel, we write y = ζn(x1, . . . , xn) instead of ζn(x1, . . . , xn, y).
Monotone in CONVEX (G). If for two (strongly connected)
graphs H and G we have
As a consequence, we get that for a
Hence, by abusing the notation, we sometime write f (CONVEX (G)) instead of f (G).
Continuous function. f is a continuous function. Formally, if
f is the solution for a k-dimensional objective, then for every n ∈ N the function ζn : (R k ) n → R is a continuous function, i.e., for every ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for every two vectors A, B ∈ (R k ) n with |A − B| < δ it holds that |ζn(A) − ζn(B)| < ǫ.
We will show computability for the quantitative analysis problem for objectives that have a solution that satisfies the above three properties. We also consider a fourth special property, and we will show decidability for the boolean analysis problem for objectives that have a solution that satisfies all four properties.
Fourth property.
A solution f = {ζ1, . . . , ζn, ζn+1, . . . } satisfies the fourth property if the next problem is decidable (for the set {ζ1, . . . , ζn, ζn+1, . . . }):
• Input: a threshold ν ∈ Q and a set of n matrices A1, . . . , An, where Ai is a k×mi matrix for some mi ∈ N.
• Task: determine if the inequality ζn(A1·x1, . . . , An·xm) ≤ ν subject to xi ∈ QSI(mi) is feasible (note that the result of the multiplication Ai · xi is a vector of size k).
In the next example we demonstrate the above properties.
Example 2. Consider the two-dimensional one-player solution function f (G) = max (x,y)∈CONVEX (G)
[max(x + y + 10, −x + y + 10, min(−x + y − 10, x + y − 10))]. We demonstrate that f is first-order definable by giving the explicit formula for ζ2, that is, the formula for a (strongly connected) graph with only two simple cycles with average weights (x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
(Technically max and min are not in R, <, +, × , but they are trivially definable in this vocabulary.) Clearly if for two graphs we have Figure 4 we illustrate the geometrical interpreta- 
is monotone), and ζ2 is obviously a continuous function (and in general ζn is also continuous). Hence, f satisfies Properties 1-3. In

Informal overview of the solution for two-player games
The key notion for our solution is games according to strategies. When a one-player solution f is given, the boolean analysis problem amounts to determining whether there is a finite-memory strategy σ such that for every strongly-connected component (SCC)
In Lemma 4 we show that w.l.o.g we may assume that for any σ the graph G σ is strongly connected. Hence, in Section 3 we investigate the set {CONVEX (G σ ) | σ ∈ FM1} and obtain a computable characterization for it. In Section 4 we exploit the properties of the oneplayer solution and the results of Section 3 and we obtain a firstorder formula over rationals that computes the values that player 1 can enforce. We use the fact that f is continuous to show that the formula has the same infimum over rationals and reals, and hence, due to Tarski's Theorem the infimum value is computable. We also show that if Property 4 holds, then one can effectively determine whether the formula has an assignment that gives a value of at most ν. In Section 5 we apply these results for mean-payoff expressions. We show that their one-player solution satisfies Properties 1-3, and that it satisfies property 4 if and only if H10 (Q) is decidable.
CONVEX Cycles Problem
In this section, we consider the next problem:
• Task: determine whether there is a player-1 finite-memory strat-
(We call such strategy a realizing strategy.)
We first present the solution for the above problem, and then we show how to find all the sets of vectors for which there is a realizing player-1 finite-memory strategy.
The solution for Problem 1 relies on the next lemma.
Lemma 1. For a game graph G and a set of vectors V, there exists a player-1 finite-memory strategy σ for which CONVEX (G σ ) ⊆ CONVEX (V) iff for every player-2 memoryless strategy τi there exists a player-1 finite-memory strategy σi such that
Proof. The proof for the direction from left to right is trivial (since any cycle in (G τ i ) σ is also a cycle in G σ ). Our proof for the converse direction is inspired by [12] , and the key intuition of the proof is the following. Let v be a player-2 vertex, with two out-edges e1 and e2, and let G1 = G − {e1} and G2 = G − {e2}. Suppose that player 1 has two finite-memory strategies σ1 and σ2 such that CONVEX (G
this is also a violating memoryless strategy for G, and the claim follows. Otherwise, we construct a realizable player-1 strategy in G in the following way. For i = 1, 2, let σi be a finite-memory player-1 realizable strategy in Gi, If in σ1 (resp., σ2), the vertex v is unreachable then it is surely a winning strategy also for G. Otherwise, there exists a memory state m such that (m, v) is a vertex in G σ 1 1 , and we denote by σ ′ 1 the strategy that is obtained by changing σ1 initial memory state to m. We construct σ in the following way. The memory structure of σ is a tuple (M1, M2, {1, 2}) where M1 is the memory structure of σ ′ 1 , M2 is the memory structure of σ2, and the third value in the tuple indicates if we are playing according to σ ′ 1 or σ2. At the beginning of a play, σ decides according to σ2 (and updates M2 accordingly). If σ decides according to σ2 and edge e1 is visited, then σ decides according to σ ′ 1 (and updates M1 accordingly), until edge e2 is visited, and then σ again decides according to σ2, and so on. We note that σ is a finite-memory strategy, and that any simple cycle in G σ is a composition of simple cycles from G 2 . Hence, the average weight of any simple cycle in G σ is λx1 + (1 − λ)x2 for some λ ∈ [0, 1] and xi ∈ Avg(Gi) ⊆ CONVEX (V). And thus, a convex combination of x1 and x2 is also in CONVEX (V), and we get that CONVEX (G σ ) ⊆ CONVEX (V). Therefore, σ is a realizing strategy and the proof is completed.
We now wish to characterize all the sets of vectors that have a realizing strategy. For this purpose we give the next definition. For a player-2 memoryless strategy τ , let Π τ e be the (finite) set of Eulerian cyclic paths in G τ , that is Π τ e contains only cyclic paths that visit every edge at most once. For every path π ∈ Π τ e , let c1, . . . , ct be the simple cycles that occur in π and we associate a t × k matrix Aπ to every path π such that the i-th column of the matrix is Avg(ci). We observe that
The next lemma shows how to compute the realizable sets of vectors. vectors V ⊆ R k is realizable if and only if there exist x1, . . . ,
Proof. First we characterize the realizable vector sets when a player-2 memoryless strategy τ is given, that is, we characterize the realizable vectors in a one-player game. A finite-memory strategy σ in a one-player graph G τ is an ultimately periodic infinite path, and (G τ ) σ is a lasso shaped graph with exactly one cycle. The cycle of (G τ ) σ is obviously a cyclic path in G τ , and thus V is realizable in G τ iff there is a cyclic path π in G τ with Avg(π) ∈ CONVEX (V).
Hence, by Lemma 1, we get that V is realizable iff for every player-2 memoryless strategy τi there is a cyclic path πi in G τ i with Avg(πi) ∈ CONVEX (V). Since such witness πi exists iff there exists xi ∈ π∈Π τ i e {Aπ ·x | x ∈ QSI} with Avg(πi) = xi, then the proof is completed.
In the next example we illustrate the geometrical interpretation of Lemma 2. Figure 5 , where the box vertices are controlled by player 2. Player 2 has two possible memoryless strategies, namely, τ1 that follows the edge v0 → v1 and τ2 that follows v0 → v4. In G τ 1 the set of Eulerian cyclic paths Π τ 1 e contains all cyclic sub-paths of the Eulerian cyclic path v1 → v2 → v2 → v3 → v3 → v1. Hence, the average weight of any infinite lasso path in G τ 1 is a convex combination of Avg(v1 → v2 → v3 → v1), Avg(v2 → v2) and Avg(v3 → v3) (points D, F and E in Figure 6 ). In G τ 2 , an Eulerian cyclic path is either a sub-path of v4 → v5 → v5 → v4 or the path v6 → v6. Hence, the average weight of any infinite lasso path is either a convex combination of Avg(v4 → v5 → v4) and Avg(v5 → v5) (points A and B in Figure 6 ), or it is Avg(v6 → v6) (point C in Figure 6 ). By Lemma 2,  
Example 3. Consider the game graph G in
we get that a set of vectors V is realizable if and only if CONVEX (V) intersects with the polygon DEF and with either the line AB or with the point C (or with both).
Generic Solution for Games with Quantitative Objectives
In this section we solve the quantitative analysis problem for games with quantitative objectives that satisfy Properties 1-3 and we solve the boolean analysis problem for objectives that satisfy Properties 1-4. We first give a conceptual (i.e., not always computable) solution for the boolean analysis problem, and then extend the solution for the quantitative analysis problem. An equivalent formulation for the boolean analysis problem is to ask whether for a game graph G and a threshold ν there is a player-1 (finite-memory) strategy σ such that the one-player solution over G σ is at most ν. By the third property (convex monotonicity), it is enough to determine whether there is σ such that for every SCC S of G σ it holds that f (CONVEX (S)) ≤ ν (where f is the solution for the one-player game). However, we first show how to determine whether there is σ such that f (CONVEX (G σ )) ≤ ν and only then solve the original problem.
Lemma 3. Let f be a one-player solution that satisfies Properties 1-3. Then infσ∈FM 1 f (CONVEX (G σ )) is computable (when the input is a game graph G). If f also satisfies Property 4, then the problem of determining whether there is a player-1 finitememory strategy σ such that f (CONVEX (G σ )) ≤ ν is decidable (when the input is G and ν).
Proof. Let τ1, . . . , τm be all player-2 memoryless strategies in G (note that m is at most exponential in |G|). By Lemma 2, and by the monotonicity of f , there is a player-1 strategy σ that satisfies f (CONVEX (G σ )) ≤ ν if and only if there are matrices Aπ 1 , . . . , Aπ m and vectors x1, . . . , xm such that πi ∈ Π τ i e and xi ∈ QSI and ζm(Aπ 1 · x1, . . . , Aπ m · xm) ≤ ν. For every τi, the set Π If f satisfies Property 4, then for a given π1, . . . , πm we can effectively check if the inequality is satisfiable. Hence, we can effectively determine whether there is σ such that f (CONVEX (G σ )) ≤ ν. Moreover, for a given π1, . . . , πm the expression infx 1 ,...,xm∈SI ζm(Aπ 1 · x1, . . . , Aπ m · xm) is first-order definable (recall that ζm is first-order definable) over R, <, +, × (note that xi ranges over SI and not over QSI) and therefore, by Taski's Theorem [13] its value is computable. Since ζm is continuous we get that infx 1 ,...,xm∈SI ζm(Aπ 1 · x1, . . . , Aπ m · xm) = infx 1 ,...,xm∈QSI ζm(Aπ 1 · x1, . . . , Aπ m · xm). Finally, by Lemma 2, we have that infσ∈FM 1 f (CONVEX (G σ )) = inf π 1 ∈Π τ 1 e ,...,πm∈Π τm e infx 1 ,...,xm∈QSI ζm(Aπ 1 · x1, . . . , Aπ m · xm), and since Π τ i e is finite we get that
Before presenting the algorithm for the boolean analysis problem we recall the (standard) definitions of winning regions and attractors. Let G be a game graph with an initial vertex v0, and let v be an arbitrary vertex in G. We denote by (G, v) the game graph that is formed from G by changing the initial vertex to v. We say that a vertex v is in player-1 winning region (denoted by Win1) if player 1 wins in (G, v) (that is, player 1 has a finite-memory strategy that assures a value at most ν to the objective). The player-1 attractor set of a vertex v (denoted by Attr1(v)) contains all the vertices from which player 1 can force reachability to v (after finite number of rounds). It is well known that the attractor set of a vertex is computable (even in linear time) and that player 1 can force reachability by a finite-memory strategy (in fact, even by a memoryless strategy). The next remark shows another important property of attractors and winning regions.
Remark 1. Let G be a game graph over a boolean objective that is formed by a quantitative objective with a solution function f and a threshold ν, and let v be a vertex in G. Then for every vertex u /
∈ Attr1(v), if σ is a finite-memory player-1 strategy for (G, u), then σ is a winning strategy in (G − Attr1(v), u).
Proof. We denote H = G−Attr1(v) and we observe that (H, u) σ is a subgraph of (G, u) σ . Hence, for every SCC S ∈ H there is a corresponding SCC S ′ ∈ G such that f (CONVEX (S ′ )) ≤ ν. Since CONVEX (S) ⊆ CONVEX (S ′ ) and by the monotonicity of f we get that f (CONVEX (S)) ≤ ν and therefore σ is a winning strategy in (H, u).
Algorithm 1 computes player-1 winning region, and we prove its correctness in Lemma 4
Algorithm 1 Player-1 winning region computation for quantitative objectives
Lemma 4. Algorithm 1 computes player-1 winning region.
Proof. We first prove that in every step of the algorithm, if a vertex u ∈ W , then u ∈ Win1. We prove the assertion by considering the next three cases: (i) There is a strategy σ for which f (CONVEX ((G, u) σ )) ≤ ν. In this case, for every SCC S ∈ (G, u) σ we have that CONVEX (S) ⊆ CONVEX ((G, u) σ ) and by the monotonicity of f we get that f (CONVEX (S)) ≤ ν. Hence, u ∈ Win1. (ii) There is a vertex v and a strategy σ s.t f (CONVEX ((G, v) σ )) ≤ ν and u ∈ Attr1(v). In this case, v is in player-1 winning region and therefore the attractor of v is also in Win1. (iii) For some vertex v we have u ∈WINNINGREGION(G− Attr1(v), f, ν) and f (CONVEX ((G, v) σ )) ≤ ν for some strategy σ. By a simple induction on the size of the graph we get that u is in player-1 winning region for the game graph G − Attr1(v). The following strategy is a winning strategy for (G, u): (a) play according to the winning strategy over G − Attr1(v); (b) if the pebble is in vertex v, then play according to σ. Hence, if u ∈ W , then u ∈ Win1 and we get that Win1 ⊇ W .
In order prove the converse direction, we first prove that if Win1 = ∅, then W = ∅. Indeed, if v ∈ Win1, then for some strategy σ we have that for every SCC S ∈ (G, v)
σ it holds that f (CONVEX (S)) ≤ ν. Let S ′ be a terminal SCC in (G, v) σ and let (u, m) be a vertex in S ′ (where u is a vertex in G and m is a memory state of σ). Let σ ′ be the strategy that is formed by changing σ initial memory state to m. Then (G, u)
Hence, the if condition in the for loop is satisfied at least once, and W = ∅. We are now ready to prove that Win1 ⊆ W . Towards a contradiction we assume the existence of u ∈ (Win1 − W ). By the definition of Algorithm 1 it follows that there is a subgraph H ⊆ G such that u ∈ H and the algorithm returns ∅ when it runs over H. Hence, player-1 winning region in H is empty (namely, u / ∈ Win1 over game graph H) and by Remark 1 we get that u / ∈ Win1 in game graph G and the contradiction follows. Thus Win1 ⊆ W .
We present a similar algorithm for the computation of quantitative analysis of quantitative objectives. For this purpose we extend the notion of winning regions to quantitative objectives by defining value regions. For a threshold ν we say that a vertex v is in ν value region (denoted by VR(ν)) if infσ∈FM 1 sup τ ∈S 2 Val σ,τ = ν (when the initial vertex of the game is v). Algorithm 2 computes value regions by a call to VALUEREGION(G, f, −∞), and its correctness follows by the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4. We note that if f satisfies Properties 1-3, then by Lemma 3, there is an effective procedure to compute infσ∈FM 1 f (CONVEX ((G, v) σ )) (hence, Algorithm 2 can be effectively executed) and if f satisfies Properties 1-4, then by the same lemma we get that there is a procedure to determine whether f (CONVEX ((G, v) σ )) ≤ ν (hence, Algorithm 1 can be effectively executed). Hence, we get the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Let f be the one-player solution of a quantitative objective.
• If f satisfies Properties 1-3, then the corresponding quantitative analysis problem is computable.
• If f satisfies Properties 1-4, then the corresponding boolean analysis problem is decidable.
We note that Theorem 1 provides a recipe for the construction of ǫ-optimal strategies. If the infimum value that player 1 can achieve is ν, then the process that enumerates all σ ∈ F M1 and halts if the one-player solution of G σ is at most ν + ǫ will always terminate. Similarly, if the boolean analysis problem is decidable, then it is possible to effectively construct a finite-memory strategy that assures the corresponding threshold (we first check if such a strategy exists, and if it does exist, then we enumerate all finitememory strategies until we find a strategy σ such that the solution for G σ is at most ν).
Games with Mean-Payoff Expression Objectives
In this section, we give the formal definition of mean-payoff expressions and we use the results of Section 4 to analyze games with mean-payoff expressions. In Subsection 5.1 we define meanpayoff expressions and show that optimal strategies may require infinite memory. In Subsection 5.2 we analyze mean-payoff expression games.
Mean-payoff expression objectives
The class of mean-payoff expressions is the closure of single dimension mean-payoff objectives under the algebraic operations of min, max, sum and numerical complement. Formally, for an infinite sequence of reals ρ = a1, a2, · · · ∈ R ω , we denote LimInfAvg(ρ) = lim infn→∞ a 1 +···+an n and LimSupAvg(a1, a2, . . . ) = lim sup n→∞ a 1 +···+an n . For an infinite sequence of vectors ρ = v1, v2 · · · ∈ (R k ) ω we denote be the projection of ρ to the i-th dimension by ρi, and we denote LimInfAvg i (ρ) = LimInfAvg(ρi) and LimSupAvg i (ρ) = LimSupAvg(ρi). An atomic expression over R k is either LimInfAvg i or LimSupAvg i . If E1 and E2 are expressions, then −E1, max(E1, E2), min(E1, E2) and sum(E1, E2) are also expressions. For a sequence ρ ∈ (R k ) ω and an expression E, LimSupAvg 2 ) , and the value of E for the sequence (−1, 1) ω is min(−1, −1 + 1) + max(−1, 1) = 0. We say that an expression E is of normal form if (i) the numerical complement does not occur in E; and (ii) for every dimension i, there is at most one occurrence of an atomic expression Ai ∈ {LimInfAvg i , LimSupAvg i }; and (iii) E = max(E1, . . . , E ℓ ), where Ei is a max-free expression (that is, the max operator does not occur in Ei). The next simple lemma shows that w.l.o.g we may consider only games over normal form expressions.
Lemma 5. For every k-dimensional weighted graph G with a weight function w and an expression E, we can effectively construct an m-dimensional weight function w ′ and a normal form expression F such that every infinite path in G gets the same value according to (E, w) and according to (F, w ′ ).
Proof. We can easily overcome the restriction on the number of atomic expressions per dimension by creating several copies of the same dimension (that is, additional dimensions with weights that are identical to the original dimension). We can create an equivalent numerical complement free expression by the following recursive process. If E = −LimInfAvg i (respectively, E = −LimSupAvg i ), then we multiply all the weights in dimension i by −1 and define
, then we recursively change the weights and construct normal form expressions F1 and F2 that are equivalent to −E1 and −E2, and return the normal form expression F = op(F1, F2). And we similarly handle the expression E = op(E1, E2). Finally, if we have a numerical complement free expression E, then we construct an equivalent expression F = max(F1, . . . , F ℓ ), where Fi is a max free expression, by the following recursive procedure: If E is an atomic expression, then we return F = max(E, E). If E = op(E1, E2), then we recursively construct two expressions F1 and F2, such that Fi is equivalent to Ei and F1 = max(G1, . . . , Gr), F2 = max(H1, . . . , Hq) (where Hi and Gi are max-free expressions), and we return F = max i∈{1,...,r},j∈{1,...,q} {op(Gi, Hj)}.
Hence, in the rest of the paper we will assume w.l.o.g that all the expressions are of normal form. The next example shows that optimal strategies for mean-payoff expressions may require infinite memory. Figure 7 and the expression E = max(LimInfAvg 1 , LimInfAvg 2 ). In this game graph there is only one vertex that is controlled by player 1 and two self-loop edges, namely e1 with w(e1) = (9, 1) and e2 with w(e2) = (1, 9). We first observe that any finite-memory strategy gives a value of at least 5 to E. Indeed, a finite-memory strategy induces an ultimately periodic path π with LimInfAvg(π) = αw(e1) + (1 − α)w(e2) for some α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q. Hence, E(π) = max(9α + 1 − α, α + 9 − 9α) = max(8α + 1, 9 − 8α), and the minimum value for E is obtained when α = 1 2 and we get that the minimal value for E is 5. We now describe a player-1 infinite-memory strategy that gives a value of at most 2 to E. The strategy is simple. It follows e2 as long as the average weight in the first dimension is more than 2, then it follows e1 as long as the average weight in the second dimension is more than 2, and this process is repeated forever (i.e., e2 is followed for a while, then e1 and so on). Clearly, in the formed path π the average weight of the first dimension is at most 2 for infinitely many prefixes of π. Hence LimInfAvg 1 (π) ≤ 2, and by the same arguments LimInfAvg 2 (π) ≤ 2. Thus, E(π) ≤ 2, and we establish the fact that optimal strategies may require infinite-memory strategies (in this example, the presented infinite-memory strategy is not optimal, Algorithm 2 Value region computation for quantitative objectives. The algorithm invokes VALUEREGION(G, f, −∞). but we demonstrated that the best finite-memory strategy does not give an optimal value).
Example 4. Consider the game graph in
VALUEREGION(G, f, ValLowerBound ) if G = ∅ then for v ∈ G do I[v] ← max(infσ∈FM 1 f (CONVEX ((G, v) σ )), ValLowerBound ) end for u ← argmin v∈G I[v] {Choose u s.t I[u] = minv∈G I[v]} VR(I[u]) ← VR(I[u]) ∪ Attr1(u) {Add Attr1(u) to
Synthesis of a finite-memory controller for mean-payoff expression objectives
In this subsection we apply Theorem 1 to mean-payoff expression objectives. We first prove that the solution for mean-payoff expressions satisfies Properties 1-3 , and thus the quantitative analysis problem is computable for mean-payoff expression games. We then show that the boolean analysis problem is inter-reducible with Hilbert's tenth problem over rationals (H10 (Q)) by showing that an effective algorithm for H10 (Q) implies that mean-payoff expressions satisfy Property 4, and by a reduction from H10 (Q) to mean-payoff expression games. One-player games were solved in [6] and in [15] . We present our solution from [15] to establish properties of the one-player solution. For an expression E and a one-player game (G, v0), that is, a game over graph G with initial vertex v0, we say that a threshold ν is feasible if the player has a strategy that achieves a value at least ν (we recall that in the one-player setting, the player aim to maximize the value of the objective). The max-free constraints were presented in [14] (Section A.4), and they describe the feasible thresholds of a max-free expression (a threshold ν is feasible if the one-player can achieve a value of at least ν).
Definition 1 (Max-free constraints). Let G be a strongly-connected k-dimensional game graph, and we recall that C(G) is the set of simple cycles of G. Let E be a max-free expression such that the first j dimensions of G occur in E as lim-inf (and the others as lim-sup). We define a variable X where ME is a matrix that is independent of the graph, and computable from E. (We note that in [14] , the first type of constraints was c∈C(G) X i c wm(c) ≥ rm, where wm is the projection of w to the m-th dimension, and the second type of constraints was c∈C(G) |c|X i c = 1. It is straight forward to verify that the constraints are equivalent -in terms of feasibility. In addition, the fourth constraint was presented as ME × r ≥ bν ; but the proof of Lemma 7 in [14] implies that bν = (0, . . . , 0, ν)
T .) We proved in [15] that a threshold ν is feasible if and only if the corresponding max-free constraints are feasible. For a maxfree expression E, a strongly-connected graph G and a threshold ν, we denote the max-free constraints by MFC(E, G, ν) and we observe that for a (normal-form) mean-payoff expression E = max(E1, . . . , E ℓ ) and a strongly-connected graph G, the solution function for the one-player game is f (G) = max{ν ∈ R | ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} s.t MFC(Ei, G, ν) is feasible}. By the definition of the max-free constraints, it easily follows that the solution is a function that is first-order definable and continuous (i.e., it satisfies Properties 1 and 3). In the next Lemma we prove that the solution also satisfies the second property.
Lemma 6. Let E be a mean-payoff expression over k dimensions, and let f be its one-player solution function. Then for every two strongly-connected graphs G and H: if CONVEX
Proof. Since we assume that E = max(E1, . . . , En), where Ei is a max-free expression, it is enough to prove that if a threshold ν is feasible in H for the max-free expression Ei, then it is also feasible in G. Let c H m be the simple cycles of G and H respectively. We note that since CONVEX (H) ⊆ CONVEX (G), then for every convex combination x1, . . . , xm, there is a convex combination y1, . . . , yn such that
Hence, a solution for the max-free constraints over graph H induces a solution for the max-free constraints over G (by replacing, in the inequalities of constraints 1 over graph H, every convex combination of cycles of H by the corresponding convex combination of cycles of G).
Thus, every threshold that is feasible for H is also feasible for G, and the proof follows.
Hence, the one-player solution function of mean-payoff expressions satisfies Properties 1-3 and the next theorem follows.
Theorem 2. The quantitative analysis problem for mean-payoff expression games (where player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies) is computable.
We now show that the solution for one-player mean-payoff expression games satisfies Property 4 if and only if H10 (Q) is decidable. We first prove the direction from right to left. Proof. Let G be an arbitrary strongly connected graph with n simple cycles, let C(G) = {c1, . . . , cn} be its set of simple cycles, let E = max(E1, . . . , Em) be a mean-payoff expression (where Ei is a max-free expression), and let ν be a rational threshold. We recall that the sentence (ζn (Avg(c1) , . . . , Avg(cn) ≤ ν) is equivalent to the statement: "For every y > ν and i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the constraints MFC(Ei, G, y) are infeasible." By the definition of the max-free constraints, when the set Avg(G) is fixed the above statement is easily reduced to the infeasibility of m linear systems. Motzkins Transposition Theorem (e.g., Theorem 1 in [2] ) gives a witness to the infeasibility of a set of linear inequalities. We use Lagrange four-square Theorem to construct a Diophantine equation that has a rational root if and only if the witness exists. We show that the construction works also when Avg(G) is not fixed, i.e., when Avg(G) = {A1x1, . . . , A1xn} for some n matrices A1, . . . , An and n vectors of rational variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ QSI. (The details of the construction are given in the technical report [17] .) Hence, if H10 (Q) is decidable, then mean-payoff expressions satisfy the fourth property.
We now prove the reduction from H10 (Q) to the boolean analysis of mean-payoff expression games, and we show that there is a reduction even for a simpler subclass of mean-payoff expressions. An expression E is sum-free and LimInfAvg-only if only the min and max operators occur in E and all the atomic expressions in E are of the form LimInfAvg i . (In addition, the numerical complement operator also does not occur). The next lemma shows that the boolean analysis problem for sum-free LimInfAvg-only expressions is H10 (Q)-hard.
Lemma 8.
If the boolean analysis problem is decidable for sumfree LimInfAvg-only expressions, then H10 (Q) is decidable.
Proof. We only present a rough and informal sketch of the proof. The full proof is given in the technical report [17] . We first show a reduction from H10 (Q) to the problem of finding a rational solution for two set of variables Q = {q1, . . . , qn} and P = {p1, . . . , pn} and a set of constraints, each of them is of the form: (i) i∈I αiqi ≤ 0, for some I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}; or (ii) i∈I αipi ≤ 0, for some I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}; or (iii) qipj = q k p ℓ for some i, j, k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}; subject to qi, pi > 0. We then show a reduction from the boolean analysis problem to the above problem. We illustrate the reduction by showing the construction for the set of constraints {q1 − 2q2 ≤ 0, 2p1 − 3p2 ≤ 0, p1q1 = p2q2}. For the these constraints we build a game graph G that is illustrated in Figure 8 . In the figure we explicitly show only part of the weight vectors and only part of the dimensions. The initial vertex of G is s0 and this vertex is a player-2 vertex (and the rest are player-1 vertices). The objective of the game is the expression E = max(1, min(2, 3), min (4, 5) ), where i stands for LimInfAvg i (for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and the threshold is 0. In G, player 2 has only two memoryless strategies, namely τ1 = s0 → b1 and τ1 = s0 → a1. We rely on Lemma 4 and show that player 1 has a winning strategy if and only if there is a finite path π1 that visits only the self-loops of b2 and a path π2 that visits only the self-loops of a2 such that every vector in v ∈ CONVEX (Avg(π1), Avg(π2)) satisfies the winning condition, i.e., if v = (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5), then max(v1, min(v2, v3), min(v4, v5)) ≤ 0. We observe that for any such path π1 it holds that Avg(π1) = q1(3, 1, 0, −1, 0) + q2(−2, 0, −1, 0, 1) and similarly Avg(π2) = p1(2, −1, 0, 1, 0) + p2(−1, 0, 1, 0, −1) for some positive rational q1, q2, p1, p2. We further observe that if q1 − 2q2 > 0, then Avg(π1) is positive in the first dimension, and thus there is a vector v ∈ CONVEX (Avg(π1), Avg(π2)) that gives a positive value to the expression. Hence, it must hold that q1 − 2q2 ≤ 0 and similarly 2p1 − 3p2 ≤ 0. Moreover, we prove that if p1q1 = p2q2, then there exists v ∈ CONVEX (Avg(π1), Avg(π2)) that is positive either in dimensions 2 and 3 or in dimensions 4 and 5. Hence, it must hold that p1q1 = p2q2 and the proof follows. We also consider the case where both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies. In this setting, the quantitative analysis problem is to compute infσ∈FM 1 sup τ ∈F M 2 Val σ,τ . The boolean analysis problem is to determine whether player 1 has a finitememory strategy that assures a value of at most ν against any player-2 finite-memory strategy.
Theorem 4. When both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies: (i) the quantitative analysis problem for mean-payoff expression games is computable; (ii) the boolean analysis problem for mean-payoff expression games is inter-reducible with H10 (Q),
and it is H10 (Q)-hard even for sum-free LimInfAvg-only expressions.
Proof. We present a sketch of the proof. The full proof is given in the technical report [17] . Informally, when both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies, the outcome of a play is an ultimately periodic path, and thus we may assume that all the atomic expressions are of the form of LimInfAvg (because for periodic paths we have LimInfAvg(π) = LimSupAvg(π)). We also show that if all the atomic expressions are LimInfAvg and player 1 is restricted to finite-memory strategies, then player 2 can achieve a value greater than ν if and only if he can do it with a finite-memory strategy, and the proof follows.
As a final remark, we note that while the boolean analysis for sum-free LimInfAvg-only expressions is H10 (Q)-hard when player 1 is restricted to a finite-memory strategy (and also when both players are restricted to finite-memory strategies), the next lemma shows that the problem is decidable when both players may use arbitrary strategies.
Lemma 9 (Theorem 5 in [16] ). When both players may use arbitrary strategies, the boolean analysis of sum-free LimInfAvg-only expression games is decidable.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 5 in [16] due to the fact that there is an immediate translation from sum-free LimInfAvgonly expressions to the MeanPayoffInf ≤ (ν) objectives that were defined in [16] .
Discussion and Future Work
In this work we studied the synthesis of finite-memory strategies for games with robust multidimensional mean-payoff objectives, and we obtained two main results. The first is a positive result, namely, the computability of the quantitative analysis problem. The second has a negative flavour, and it shows that the boolean analysis is inter-reducible with Hilbert's Tenth problem over rationals.
From a practical point of view, the positive result is the most interesting, since for the first time (to the best of our knowledge) a recipe is given for computing ǫ-optimal finite-memory strategies for a robust class of quantitative objectives. A future work is to investigate whether the construction of these ǫ-optimal strategies is feasible, both in terms of memory size and computational complexity. From the theoretical point of view, the negative result is a bit surprising since it suggests that the boolean analysis is harder than the optimization problem, and in computer science typically there is a naive reduction from optimization problems to the corresponding decision problems. However, in our case, the optimization computes only the greatest upper bound, and since optimal finitememory strategies need not exist, then the reduction fails. In fact, the hardness result suggests that it is even H10 (Q)-hard to determine whether an optimal strategy exists. A future work is to investigate games in which player 1 may use arbitrary infinite-memory strategies. Additional direction for future work is to consider more general algebraic structures over multidimensional mean-payoff objectives.
